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Abstract
We design an experiment to test whether the rationality that is induced by market-like 
discipline spills over to nonmarket valuation settings—a rationality spillover. Our 
results confirm that this new phenomenon exists. The rationality stimulated by market-
like discipline extends to the nonmarket setting, and these spillover effects are robust 
even when the nonmarket setting involves hypothetical choices and environmental 
lotteries. We observe that people stop reversing their preferences for lotteries by revising 
downward their stated values to buy and sell high-risk lotteries; they do not change their 
preference ordering.
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1. Introduction
The concep t of rationality belongs to economics. Commentators within and outside the 
discipline treat the two as synonymous. Though a good deal of parsing is done, rationality simply 
amounts to doing the best one can with the resources one has or exp ects to have. The parsing 
revolves around what constitutes ‘‘the best’’ and how p ercep tions of it evolve, and the role of 
social relationships in the definition of ‘‘resources’’. Constraints on a person’s cognition and on 
his computational skills limit his ability to achieve the best, e.g., [30,51]. These internal constraints 
imply that rationality is a scarce commodity, which he must somehow ration.
But the burden of this scarcity is reduced and even eliminated if he has access to the resources of 
a market to help him construct his rationality rather than having to rely only on his internal 
resources [1,28]. Barring new entrants, markets diffuse rationality through the p op ulation by
means of accidental or purposive imitation of and selection for rational behaviors [7]. Rationality
is then an institutional or social phenomenon rather than an individual phenomenon (see for
example [2,23,55]).
Critics, nevertheless, persist in two complaints about rational choice. The first holds that a
person’s preferences change with the context, individual or social [6,13]. An observer therefore has
difficulty telling whether a better alignment of preferences to choice is due to a change in
preferences or to a relaxation of internal constraints (i.e., refining stated values for a good). A
second complaint grants the consistency of preferences and actions in market settings but is
dubious of extending rational choice to the decisions made by socially isolated people [31]. These
nonmarket choices purportedly do not answer to the disciplined beat of the rationality drummer:
they are autonomous.
Herein we subject the context-dependent preference and nonmarket autonomy complaints to
empirical test. We report results of experiments designed to test whether the rationality that
markets induce can spill over to nonmarket settings, and whether any spillovers that occur are due
to changes in preference or to revisions in stated values. We use the classic preference reversal
phenomenon as the case study. Our results suggest rationality spillovers exist. Market and
nonmarket choices are not autonomous. Once a person’s rationality is induced in a market-like
setting, he or she can transfer that rationality to nonmarket settings. Further, results indicate that
preferences are not context dependent. People gain rationality by revising their stated valuations
of low-probability/high-payoff lotteries; they do not change their preferences for these lotteries.
These findings arise from our initial experimental treatment that purposely created conditions
most favorable for rationality spillovers. Market-like and nonmarket settings were identical
except for the arbitrage condition—people made real choices over monetary lotteries. If
rationality spillovers did not emerge in these hospitable circumstances, we would question
whether the phenomenon could ever exist in more hostile environs like contingent valuation
surveys [45]. Such surveys presume rational choices over hypothetical changes in risks to
nonmarket goods like the environment (see [21]). But this presumption is subject to challenge for
two reasons. First, the market discipline that induces rationality is absent, and environmental
risks like climate change and biodiversity loss are low-probability/high-severity events—both
conditions create an inviting context for anomalous behavior [16,60].1 Critics have therefore
argued that new behavioral theories are needed for nonmarket valuation to account for systematic
deviations from rationality [32,33].
But before asking nonmarket valuation research to abandon rationality completely, we
extend our initial treatment to consider whether rationality spillovers remain robust when we
weaken the link between the market-like and nonmarket choice. We test robustness by keeping the
1Numerous risk perception studies have revealed that people commonly overestimate the chance that they will suffer
from a low-probability/high-severity event, e.g., a nuclear power accident or climate change catastrophe like a shift in
the Gulf stream (see e.g. [38]). When the outcome is potentially very bad, people inflate the chance that the outcome will
be realized. People often use a heuristic in which they deal with probabilities and severity additively rather than in
combination as expected utility presumes (see [42]). In addition, experience tells people little about low-probability risks
like climate change. They must rely on outside sources of information to help them make judgments about the
likelihood that a bad event will actually come to pass. And if that outside information stresses severity without giving
some notion of the odds, people systematically bias their risk perceptions upward. Policymakers are not immune to this
human fallibility either.
market-like conditions constant, while making the nonmarket choices hypothetical with the
options being uncertain wildlife experiences. We find that rationality spillovers continue to be
robust in this contingent valuation context—people achieved rationality in the nonmarket setting
despite the lack of arbitrage, the nonbinding choices, and the nonmonetary, wildlife lotteries. And
we again find that people gain rationality through refining values, not changing preferences. This
suggests that while people in the typical one-shot survey might overstate their values for low-
probability/high-severity environmental risks, with arbitrage-like feedback they can make their
stated values more consistent with their preferences.
2. Preference reversals and rationality spillovers
We explore this idea of rationality spillovers in the context of the classic irrationality labeled as
preference reversals.2 Preference reversals provide an excellent basis to explore rationality
spillovers because the phenomenon has been shown to persist in isolation and to diminish with
arbitrage [9,18]. When facing two lotteries with similar expected values but different levels of risk,
people frequently reverse their preferences by choosing the low-risk lottery (high probability–low
payoff) but placing a higher value on the least preferred, high-risk lottery (low probability–high
payoff).3 This inconsistent behavior may arise from misjudging preferences or valuations or both.
And this behavior creates opportunities for others to extract gains through exchange.
Inconsistencies are reduced or eliminated when the arbitrage provided within an exchange
institution that makes the person learn to maximize the surplus he captures.
The two open questions we explore are: (a) whether rationality spillovers exist—an indirect
effect from arbitrage that induces rational behavior in a secondary institution which lacks
arbitrage; and (b) what underlying behavior adjustments are made that lead to more rational
behavior—when arbitrage induces rationality spillovers, do people adjust preferences, valuations
or both? We develop a series of testable hypotheses to address these questions.
To begin, we provide a benchmark test to calibrate our results with earlier work. The direct
rationality hypothesis tests whether arbitrage in an institution directly induces rationality within
the same institution. That highly arbitraged, market-like settings possess great power to induce
rational behavior is not news. We know other people will often take advantage of a person if he
engages in irrational behaviors in the arbitrage setting. Given that he values separately each of any
series of bets he makes [40], this Dutch book scenario can turn the irrational person in an
arbitrage setting into a money pump who will either go broke or come to see that it is not smart to
be irrational in the sense of not trying to maximize expected utility [47]. Controlled experiments
2The preference reversal phenomenon contradicts the presumption that elicited preferences should be invariant to the
elicitation method (see [37,56,58]). See for example the overviews on procedural invariance and preference reversals by
Camerer [16] and Tammi [57]. Evidence shows a robust inconsistency in an isolated person’s preference orderings and
expressed valuations despite inducements like greater rewards, different presentations, training, record keeping, and a
hypothetical setting (see [26,39,43,46]).
3The study of preference reversals is especially relevant for us because we are also interested in the management of
environmental risks like climate change and biodiversity loss, which are low-probability/high-severity events (see [54]).
have often demonstrated the power of arbitrage.4 If our results are consistent with previous
experiments, we expect to support the:
Direct rationality hypothesis—a person’s initial irrationality in a market institution is reduced in
the presence of arbitrage in the same market institution.
Previous demonstrations of arbitrage-induced rationality have, however, been limited to stand-
alone settings. The possibility that the rationality induced in one setting can spill over to another
setting has escaped scrutiny.5 The key idea in our story is that an isolated person makes his
choices conditional on the degree of rationality he earlier achieved when his choices were
susceptible to arbitrage. We ask whether the weight of prior arbitrage can help him ease the
burden of his isolation. Can he build habits of mind to envision and to act upon opportunities to
extract surpluses in nonmarket settings? Just as an individual’s rationality need not have a role in
achieving collective rationality, rationality spillovers to nonmarket from arbitraged settings can
be undesigned—a lengthened invisible hand.6 Nevertheless, rationality spillovers from arbitrage
must ex post cause a person’s cognition and computational skill to have a role in what he can
achieve in nonmarket settings. Because no one is around to press him, the isolated person must
draw upon his internal resources if he is to use any lessons in rationality gained from his arbitrage
experiences. Therefore, we test the:
Rationality spillover hypothesis—a person’s irrationality in a nonmarket institution is reduced
by the presence of arbitrage in a parallel market institution.
If rationality spillovers are found to exist, the question then is whether people adjust their
preference ordering or their valuation statements to reverse their preference reversal. Further, we
ask whether the type of lottery a person confronts—low-risk or high-risk lotteries—influences
these adjustments. Three nonmutually exclusive hypotheses are tested:
Preference adjustment hypothesis—irrationality is corrected by adjusting preference orderings.
Valuation adjustment hypothesis for low-risk lotteries—irrationality is corrected by adjusting
stated valuations of the high-probability/low-severity lottery.
Valuation adjustment hypothesis for high-risk lotteries—irrationality is corrected by adjusting
stated valuations of the low-probability/high-severity lottery.
3. Experimental design
One hundred and sixty-six subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student body at the
University of Wyoming during the 1998 spring semester. The experiment consisted of 12 sessions
of four treatments; each treatment had 41 or 43 participants with 8–13 subjects in each session.
After entering the lab, participants signed a consent form acknowledging their voluntary
4For representative empirical demonstrations of the power of arbitrage to induce rational behavior in single, not
multiple, settings, see [3,10,15,19,23,27,53,59].
5An analytical framework for the rationality spillover hypothesis, and the formal statements of the associated
experimental hypotheses are available from the authors on request.
6An alternative perspective would permit differences in arbitrage settings between instantaneous preference
satisfaction and choices, thus allowing these choices to be premised on what they would do for the person’s rationality
in a subsequent nonmarket setting. This potentially leads to an infinite regress since the question of how the person
determines these joint choices must be answered.
participation while agreeing to abide by the instructions. Written protocols ensured uniformity
across sessions, and all subjects were inexperienced with preference reversal experiments.7 As a
guide, Table 1 summarizes the experimental design.
3.1. Treatment 1—the no-arbitrage baseline
Treatment 1 is our baseline in which subjects make binding choices over money lotteries and
preference reversals are uncontested by arbitrage. The design used a computer program to
simulate two simultaneous but independently operated institutions—a market-like choice with
arbitrage, and a nonmarket choice without arbitrage. Each round followed a nine-step process.
Step 1: Each subject was presented with two pairs of lotteries—one pair in the market-like
setting, the other pair in the nonmarket setting. In each pair, the two lotteries had similar expected
values, with a type A-lottery being low risk and type B-lottery being high risk. Subjects were
endowed with $10.00 as a beginning balance in each setting. Fig. 1 shows the computer screen
presented to the subjects.
Step 2: We elicited preferences over the pair of lotteries in the market-like setting by asking each
person ‘‘which [lottery] option do you prefer, A or B?’’
Step 3: We then elicited preferences for the second lottery pair in the nonmarket setting with the
same question.
Step 4: We elicited values for each lottery in the market-like setting by asking the subjects ‘‘what
is your fair value for [lottery] option A (B)?’’
Table 1
Description of treatments
Market Nonmarket
Treatment 1 Real choice Real choice
No arbitrage No arbitrage
Money lottery Money lottery
Treatment 2 Real choice Real choice
Arbitrage No arbitrage
Money lottery Money lottery
Treatment 3 Real choice Hypothetical choice
Arbitrage No arbitrage
Money lottery Money lottery
Treatment 4 Real choice Hypothetical choice
Arbitrage No arbitrage
Money lottery Environmental lottery
7The protocol included: randomly seating the subjects as they entered the room, disallowing any communication
whatsoever among subjects, reading the experimental instructions aloud as the subjects followed along, administering a
test of comprehension, addressing any questions or concerns raised by the subjects, and conducting the market sessions.
Experimental instructions are available from the authors on request.
Step 5: We then elicited values for each lottery in the nonmarket setting by asking the same
valuation question. Note that stated values could not exceed the $10.00 endowment, thereby
creating a real budget constraint. The experimental instructions indicated that preferences and
valuations were binding contracts that subjects could be asked to fulfill. Thus, subjects might have
had to trade their least preferred lottery for their most preferred, and to buy or sell a lottery for
their stated value. Subjects had 3minutes to complete Steps 2–5. A clock was provided for them
on the computer screen.
Step 6: After establishing preferences and valuations, an offer price was randomly drawn for
each lottery in the market institution. A subject was sold a lottery if his or her valuation of that
lottery was not less than the offer price. If a lottery was purchased, the purchase price was
subtracted from the subject’s money balance, and he or she owned the lottery. Outcomes of the
lotteries were then determined by a random draw with money balances adjusted according to any
winnings or losses.8
Step 7: We repeated this procedure in the nonmarket setting.
Fig. 1. Example of experimental computer screen.
8These procedures follow Grether and Plott [26] and Chu and Chu [18] in which preferences over lotteries are
obtained and valuations were elicited using a variation of the BDM [8] pricing procedure—in which rational expected-
utility maximizing people should truthfully reveal their values and people do not reverse preferences. Thus the
procedure assumes buying and selling prices to be equal, which imposes constant absolute risk aversion on the subjects.
Berg et al. [9] observed that behavior was statistically equivalent regardless of whether one imposed the restriction of
constant absolute risk aversion or not.
Step 8: We determined a subject’s ending money balance for the round in each setting. The
money balance equaled his beginning balance ($10.00) less the amount he spent on purchasing a
lottery, plus or minus any of his winnings or losses from playing the owned lottery. In the event
that no lotteries were purchased (indicated values were less than the offer price), the round ended
with no change in his or her money balance.
Step 9: We repeated Steps 1–8 until 15 rounds were completed. The end round was unknown to
subjects. Subjects faced a different pair of lotteries across rounds and between settings. For each
round, one of 15 lottery pairs was randomly drawn for each setting given two restrictions: (i) each
lottery pair was used only once per setting; and (ii) the same lottery pair could not be used in both
settings in the same round.9 Ending balances for each round were added to total payoffs. We then
reset each subject’s initial endowment to $10 for the next round.
This baseline treatment provides a behavioral benchmark in which stated preferences and
values are real (i.e., they influence take-home pay); lotteries are in terms of money; and preference
reversals are not arbitraged. We now vary these features to construct three additional treatments
to test our hypotheses.
3.2. Treatment 2—introducing arbitrage and rationality spillovers
Treatment 2 is constructed to test the rationality spillover hypothesis. As in the baseline,
subjects made real choices over money lotteries, but unlike the baseline, preference reversals are
arbitraged in the market-like setting after round 5. The first five rounds of treatment 2 were
identical to the baseline for comparison purposes. Beginning in round 6, preference reversals were
arbitraged in the market-like setting, but not in the nonmarket setting. As such, treatment 2 only
differed from the baseline in rounds 6–15 by contesting irrational behavior in the market-like
setting. This design highlights the direct rationality effects in the market setting, which could spill
over to the nonmarket setting.
In each round, subjects first indicated preferences and valuations in the market-like and
nonmarket settings as in the baseline treatment. Lotteries were exchanged and played in both
settings according to the procedures laid out in the baseline with one exception—subjects were
arbitraged if preferences were reversed in the market-like setting after round 5. For example,
suppose a subject preferred lottery A over B but stated a value of $3.00 for A and $5.50 for B. The
simulated market sold lottery B to the subject by presenting him the following message, ‘‘The
market sells you B for your fair value of $5.50.’’ The subject’s money balance in that market
decreased accordingly to $4.50 (=$10–$5.50) and the subject owned lottery B. The market then
acted again with the following message, ‘‘The market trades you A for B.’’ At this point, the
subject owned lottery A and had a money balance of $4.50. The market then concluded the
arbitrage procedure with the message, ‘‘The market buys lottery A for your fair value of $3.00.’’
Now the subject owned no lotteries and had an ending money balance of $7.50; the beginning
balance minus $2.50.
The simulated market thus engaged each subject, and left him with a hole in his pocket as
the price of his irrational behavior. In subsequent rounds, reversal rates in the market setting
indicated whether the person adjusted behavior due to this market discipline—the direct
9The lottery pairs used in the treatments are available on request.
rationality hypothesis. If so, reversal rates in the nonmarket setting would then show whether this
induced rationality spilled over to the nonarbitraged setting—the rationality spillover hypothesis.
3.3. Treatments 3 and 4—testing the robustness of rationality spillovers
Treatments 3 and 4 were designed to test the robustness of the rationality spillover hypothesis
by weakening the symmetry between the market-like and the nonmarket settings. In both
treatments, the market setting was identical to treatment 2—subjects made real choices over
monetary lotteries and preference reversals were arbitraged after round 5.
In treatment 3, the nonmarket setting involved hypothetical choices over monetary lotteries.
Each subject had no monetary endowment and they did not exchange or play lotteries.
Accordingly, they did not face a binding budget constraint and their stated preferences and values
were uncontested.10 Reversal rates in the nonmarket setting indicate whether rationality spillovers
persist even when the decisions are hypothetical rather than real.
In treatment 4, we further relaxed the link between the market and nonmarket settings by
having subjects make hypothetical choices over environmental lotteries. The environmental
lotteries depict nonmonetary states of nature rather than monetary wins and losses. As with
monetary lotteries, a subject chooses between two environmental lotteries, and then states his fair
price for each lottery. For example, a person could be asked to choose between lottery A—seeing
a grizzly bear with 30 percent likelihood, and lottery B—catching a cutthroat trout with 67
percent probability. In all, we constructed 15 environmental lotteries on five events in Yellowstone
National Park: seeing a grizzly, seeing a bird of prey (e.g., eagle or osprey), catching a lake trout in
Yellowstone Lake, catching a cutthroat trout, and visiting the core attractions (e.g., old faithful).
The hypothetical–environmental lottery reversal rates further tests the boundary of the rationality
spillover phenomenon in light of evidence that preference reversals exist in the nonmarket
valuation of many low-probability/high-severity environmental risks (see [14,32,41]).
4. Results and discussion
This section first reports empirical findings regarding the direct rationality hypothesis—the effect
of arbitrage within the market-like setting. We then discuss results on the rationality spillover
hypothesis—the impact of arbitrage on nonmarket choice. The section ends by reporting findings
on the behavior adjustment hypotheses—the increased rational behavior arise from a change in
preferences or a change in stated values.
4.1. Direct rationality effects from arbitrage
Result 1. Consistent with the direct rationality hypothesis, preference reversal rates are
significantly reduced when arbitrage is introduced in a real market setting.
10Past experimental evidence has revealed a hypothetical bias, in which behavior in hypothetical settings often
diverges from what people actually do when confronting real economic commitments. See for example [24], and the
citations therein.
Fig. 2 shows that arbitrage directly induces rational behavior. The figure presents the rate of
preference reversals in the real market setting over the 15 rounds for all four treatments. The
baseline treatment 1 reveals the nonarbitraged reversal rate to be about 33 percent. This rate
persisted over the 15 rounds. Treatments 2–4 introduce arbitrage after round 5. Prior to arbitrage,
the reversal rates coincide with the baseline, approximately 33 percent. The incidence of reversals
decreases dramatically once arbitrage is introduced—rates fall below 20 percent after three rounds
of arbitrage, below 12 percent after six rounds, and approach 5 percent in the final round.
Tests of proportions across treatments provide unconditional support for the existence of direct
rationality effects from arbitrage. Table 2 presents the reversal rates in the market setting across
rounds and treatments. Prior to arbitrage, reversal rates across the treatments were not
significantly different at any standard level with p-statistics ranging from –1.20 to 0.95. After four
rounds of arbitrage, reversal rates were significantly lower in the arbitrage treatments relative to
the no-arbitrage baseline (p-values o0.020). In the last rounds, the direct rationality effects from
arbitrage are highly significant across all treatments (p-values o0.001).
We complement the ‘‘between’’ analysis by performing a conditional ‘‘within’’ treatment
analysis. We estimate each treatment separately with Chamberlain’s [17] logit model for panel
data:11
Probðyit ¼ 1Þ ¼
expðzitÞ
½1þ expðzitÞ
; i ¼ 1; 2;y;N; t ¼ 6; 7;y;T ; ð1Þ
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
R
ev
er
sa
l R
at
e
Real money lotteries
with no arbitrage (T1)
  Real money lotteries with arbitrage (T3)
  Real money lotteries with arbitrage (T2)
  Real money lotteries with arbitrage (T4)
Arbitrage begins in Round 6
Round
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where zit ¼ ft þ oi:With this specification, yit is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if
preferences are reversed and 0 if preferences are consistent. Important unobserved subject
attributes such as risk preferences and propensity to reverse preferences are captured by individual
effects, oi: Of special interest are the estimated time effects, ft; a set of T  1 dummy variables
referring to rounds which indicate whether the likelihood of irrational behavior changes over
time. This specification allows for flexibility in behavior adjustments, i.e., linear, quadratic, cubic
or any other shape the data dictate.12
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients across treatments and market settings for the model
of preference reversals.13 These results illustrate how the presence of arbitrage directly affects
irrational behavior. In the nonarbitrage baseline (treatment 1), we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the incidence of inconsistent choices and valuations is unaffected by time effects in
the market (w2ð9Þ ¼ 1:68). Without arbitrage, individuals do not significantly deviate from initial
levels of reversals—irrationality persists. In the arbitrage treatments (2–4), we do reject the null
that time effects, or the feedback from arbitrage, does not influence the likelihood of reversing
preferences with Chi-square statistics of 37.97, 16.69 and 42.80. Though estimated coefficients are
not marginal effects, the negative signs within the arbitrage treatments correspond to the
thickening of rationality in the presence of arbitrage, which is depicted in Fig. 2. While facing
arbitrage, people adjusted behavior to eliminate inconsistent choices and valuations—rationality
overtook irrationality. And estimates of individual time effects reveal that induced rationality
began to surface at significantly higher levels (relative to initial round) after only three exchanges
in the contested markets. Subsequent rounds show preference reversals continued to decline as the
subject received more feedback through arbitrage. Conditional results from the real market
setting thus provide strong evidence that arbitrage induces more rational behavior within an
institution—rejecting the null and supporting the direct rationality hypothesis.
As expected, our results confirm Chu and Chu’s [18] money pump treatments in which subjects
stopped reversing preferences within two or three rounds after being arbitraged. Experience with
costly mistakes teaches people that rationality pays.14 The open issue is, as stated by Camerer [16,
p. 661], ‘‘there is no evidence of whether subjects who are disciplined this way then learn to
express preferences more consistently in the future.’’ We turn to this evidence next.
4.2. Rationality spillovers
Result 2. Reversal rates in the nonmarket setting are significantly reduced when arbitrage is present
in the market setting; therefore, we reject the null and support the rationality spillover hypothesis.
12Specific lottery effects are not included because it is the relative, not absolute, probabilities and payoffs within the
framework that lead to preference reversals. Chi-square tests confirm this reasoning with lottery effects being
insignificant.
13Models were estimated using data from the rounds that had variations across treatments—rounds 6–15. Note that
it is impossible to calculate the marginal effects because the fixed effects are unrecoverable after being conditioned out
during estimation.
14 In general, the results support the view that economic rationality is a social construct in which decisions should be
understood not in isolation, but within the context of the relevant exchange institution (e.g., [11,12,34]). Preference
reversals are less likely with repetition. Experience with arbitrage mechanisms serves as a disinterested psychological
‘‘consistency check’’ (see e.g. [5]).
Rationality spillovers exist and are robust across various settings, which lack institutional
discipline. Fig. 3 presents the reversal rates in the nonmarket setting across the four treatments. In
each case, the incidences of reversals are statistically equivalent in the initial five rounds with rates
hovering around 33 percent.15 Once arbitrage is introduced in the market-like setting of
treatments 2–4, the incidence of preference reversals in nonmarket choices diminished significantly
in each case. Reversal rates decreased to approximately 20 percent after five rounds of arbitrage
Table 3
Logit fixed effects results: preference reversal
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket
Round 7 0.1148 0.3219 0.2220 0.1236 0.4362 0.2397 0.3542 0.2716
(0.4793) (0.4646) (0.4720) (0.4975) (0.5422) (0.4903) (0.4876) (0.5221)
Round 8 0.0001 0.1110 0.7396 0.5375 0.6011 0.0001 0.4818 0.0001
(0.4831) (0.4713) (0.5070) (0.5226) (0.5539) (0.4995) (0.4940) (0.5337)
Round 9 0.2433 0.4232 1.2684** 0.5375 0.9746* 0.4044 1.0696** 0.1389
(0.4942) (0.4622) (0.5674) (0.5226) (0.5860) (0.5217) (0.5350) (0.5274)
Round 10 0.1148 0.1110 1.5011** 0.6942 1.1923** 0.7209 1.4460** 0.1389
(0.4793) (0.4713) (0.6029) (0.5342) (0.6090) (0.5455) (0.5741) (0.5274)
Round 11 0.0001 0.2180 1.5011** 1.0492* 1.4407** 0.7209 2.2708*** 0.3018
(0.4831) (0.4676) (0.6029) (0.5656) (0.6397) (0.5455) (0.7078) (0.5506)
Round 12 0.2433 0.0001 1.7845*** 1.4905** 1.4407** 0.9009 1.9396*** 1.0619*
(0.4942) (0.4759) (0.6537) (0.6169) (0.6397) (0.5620) (0.6449) (0.6143)
Round 13 0.0001 0.3219 2.6509*** 1.7660*** 1.1923** 1.3292** 2.2708*** 0.8440
(0.4831) (0.4646) (0.8593) (0.6577) (0.6090 (0.6118) (0.7078) (0.5926)
Round 14 0.2433 0.2180 2.1484*** 1.7660*** 1.7331** 1.5976** 2.7192*** 1.3085**
(0.4942) (0.4676) (0.7311) (0.6577) (0.6824) (0.6519) (0.8183) (0.6428)
Round 15 0.1148 0.1110 3.4578*** 2.5621*** 2.0934*** 1.3292** 2.7192*** 1.3085**
(0.4793) (0.4713) (1.1317) (0.8285) (0.7464) (0.6118) (0.8183) (0.6428)
w2ðft ¼ 0Þ 1.68 1.71 37.97 27.22 16.69 20.90 42.80 19.51
(p-value) (0.9956) (0.9953) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0539) (0.0131) (0.0001) (0.0212)
Na 380 410 330 350 300 360 330 350
Standard error in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
aNumbers of observations were 410 for treatments 1–3 (41 subjects over 10 rounds) and 430 for treatment 4 (43
subjects over 10 rounds)—the reported number accounts for those dropped during the estimation process because of
invariance in the dependent variable.
15While not a problem with the analysis, we note that reversal rates for the environmental lotteries are consistently
lower than those observed with the money lotteries. This likely arose due to the challenge of constructing a pair of
environmental lotteries that fit the preference reversal paradigm—two lotteries possessing similar expected values with
one being characterized as high probability–low payoff and the other being low probability–high payoff. Pilot surveys
assisted in the selection of appropriate environmental lottery pairs, but nevertheless, the reversal rates appear different
than those observed with money lotteries.
and 10 percent after nine rounds. Rationality spillovers remained robust in the hypothetical and
the environmental lottery treatments.
Tests of proportions across treatments provide evidence regarding the significance of rationality
spillovers. Table 2 presents the reversal rates across rounds by treatment for the nonmarket
setting. Prior to the introduction of arbitrage in the market setting, reversal rates in the
nonmarket settings for treatments 2–4 are statistically equivalent to the baseline treatment with p-
test statistics ranging from –0.926 to 0.621. After five rounds of arbitrage in the market, reversal
rates for nonmarket choice began to differ significantly from those in the nonarbitrage baseline. In
the final rounds, the reversal rates in treatments 2–4 are significantly different from the rates
observed in the baseline (p-values of 0.0004, 0.009 and 0.007).
While the unconditional tests across treatments indicate the existence of rationality spillovers,
we now consider a within treatment conditional test to control for unobserved heterogeneous
subject attributes such as ability and risk aversion that may play an important role in the results.
Again we use Chamberlain’s [17] fixed effects logit model (Eq. (1)) to examine how arbitrage in
one market increases the likelihood of rational behavior in a nonmarket setting that lacks such
market discipline. Recall the results for market settings of the preference reversal models in Table
3. Here we examine the estimates for the nonmarket settings to determine the presence of any
rationality spillovers from market settings. In the nonarbitrage baseline, the rates of reversal in the
nonmarket settings correspond closely to those observed in the market setting—we cannot reject
the null that the level of rationality differs across the repeated undisciplined, nonmarket settings
(w2ð9Þ ¼ 1:71). In the absence of arbitrage, irrational behavior persists over time.
But for treatments 2–4, the likelihood of irrational behavior in the nonmarket setting is
significantly reduced by the presence of repeated arbitrate in the market (w2ð9Þ ¼ 27:22; 20.90 and
19.51). With arbitrage providing discipline in the market setting, people adopted rational behavior
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Fig. 3. Preference reversal rates in the nonmarket setting.
in the nonmarket setting—rationality spills over to the nonmarket setting from that induced in the
market setting. Significant behavior adjustments begin to appear after five exchanges in the
contested market. While adjustments occur slower than this in the nonmarket setting, the
estimates suggest that rationality continued to increase in subsequent rounds of the nonmarket
setting. Results from the nonmarket choices provide conditional evidence that rationality induced
by market discipline is not limited to the market setting; rather rationality can spill over to
nonmarket setting—the rationality spillover hypothesis is supported.16
In fact, our results show that rationality spillovers are surprisingly robust in our context—
subjects transfer their learned rationality irrespective of whether the nonmarket choice was real or
hypothetical, or whether the choice involved money or hypothetical–environmental lotteries.
Across all treatments, our results support the rationality spillover hypothesis. One might expect
the spillovers to happen with similar settings, it was not so obvious that they would persist at a
similar level when the choices are hypothetical, and when the choices involve low-probability/high-
severity hypothetical–environmental goods. But the spillover phenomenon did persist. We observe
people being more rational even though they face no direct discipline and expect no reward for
their actions.
4.3. Behavior adjustment
Given the presence of direct and indirect effects from arbitrage, we now examine how people
corrected their preference reversals—did they change their preferences, did they adjust their
valuations of low- or high-risk lotteries, or both? Result 3 summarizes our findings, which we
explain in detail below.
Result 3. People adjust valuations of high-risk lotteries to achieve rationality given arbitrage; they
do not alter their preferences. In addition, people do not adjust their valuations of low-risk
lotteries with or without arbitrage.
4.3.1. Preferences
People do not change their preference ordering. To see this we again turn to the fixed effects
logit model specified in Eq. (1), in which the indicator variable takes on the value of 1 if the
subject preferred the low-risk lottery and 0 if he or she preferred the high-risk lottery. Again time
effects, ft; capture any mutation of preferences over time, and subject effects, oi; control for
unobserved individual characteristics such as perceptions and risk aversion.
16This finding is similar in spirit to a number of psychological studies which suggest that people trained in one
situation can apply what they learned to a new situation, i.e., statistical training has helped some people solve everyday
problems involving statistical reasoning (see [4,35,44]). In psychological terms, this behavior is called ‘‘generalization’’
or ‘‘transfer’’. These studies suggest that people transfer learned behavior to new settings where they avoid the earlier
behavior, which was punished. For instance, Baron et al. [5] observed that people reduced their inconsistent judgments
about health after answering a set of questions, which clearly revealed their inconsistencies. People with this consistency
training then transferred what they learned in this context to judgments framed in another context. Interestingly,
although many psychological studies conclude that transfer of learning is inversely related to the level of extrinsic
rewards, i.e., prizes or recognition or money for doing well (see e.g. [22]), we find the opposite. Our extrinsic money
pump did not reduce the transfer of rationality to the nonmarket situations in which the reward was unavailable.
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients for the preference models across treatments
and markets. In each case, Chi-square tests fail to reject the null that preferences between
the low-risk and the high-risk lotteries are equivalent over time. Therefore, we find no
evidence of any systematic adjustment of preferences between the low-risk lotteries and
the high-risk lotteries. The conclusion that repeated interaction does not impact the in-
dividual choice of lottery type arises whether the choice is in the market or nonmarket setting,
and whether the treatment uses arbitrage or not. Treatment and round effects do not play
a significant role in determining preferences—failing to reject the null, thereby not supporting
the preference adjustment hypothesis. Preference mutation is not the reason for more
rationality.
4.3.2. Valuations
People revise their stated values for high-risk lotteries; they do not revise their values for low-
risk lotteries. For a given institution, examination of adjustments in valuation is undertaken with
Table 4
Logit fixed effects results: preference for low-risk lottery
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket
Round 7 0.1209 0.4203 0.0001 0.8513* 0.2941 0.4320 1.2417** 0.2837
(0.4919) (0.4602) (0.4814) (0.5004) (0.5431) (0.5383) (0.5372) (0.5336)
Round 8 0.2394 0.0001 0.2285 0.7353 0.4392 0.5808 0.7148 0.3128
(0.4898) (0.4683) (0.4785) (0.5006) (0.5428) (0.5419) (0.5391) (0.5608)
Round 9 0.0001 0.0001 0.1170 0.8513* 0.4392 0.1424 1.2417** 0.1519
(0.4905) (0.4683) (0.4838) (0.5004) (0.5428) (0.5339) (0.5372) (0.5514)
Round 10 0.0001 0.5219 0.1170 0.0001 0.0001 0.4320 1.1119** 0.4181
(0.4905) (0.4597) (0.4838) (0.5164) (0.5462) (0.5383) (0.5370) (0.5300)
Round 11 0.1209 0.3178 0.0001 0.7353 0.1480 0.0001 1.2417** 0.2837
(0.4919) (0.4614) (0.4814) (0.5006) (0.5442) (0.5330) (0.5372) (0.5336)
Round 12 0.6298 0.4203 0.1150 0.2571 0.0001 0.0001 0.8489 0.1447
(0.5062) (0.4602) (0.4797) (0.5079) (0.5462) (0.5330) (0.5380) (0.5383)
Round 13 0.0001 0.2139 0.4530 0.7353 0.3052 0.5808 0.7148 0.1519
(0.4905) (0.4630) (0.4777) (0.5006) (0.5533) (0.5419) (0.5381) (0.5514)
Round 14 0.1209 0.3178 0.2365 0.6184 0.1480 0.1424 1.2417** 0.4181
(0.4919) (0.4614) (0.4868) (0.5014) (0.5442) (0.5339) (0.5372) (0.5300)
Round 15 0.2435 0.1082 0.4862 0.7353 0.0001 0.5808 0.7148 0.1519
(0.4941) (0.4654) (0.4956) (0.5006) (0.5462) (0.5419) (0.8183) (0.5514)
w2ðft ¼ 0Þ 3.64 3.30 4.99 8.21 3.18 4.04 10.21 4.38
(p-value) (0.9337) (0.9512) (0.8355) (0.5136) (0.9566) (0.9085) (0.3336) (0.8849)
Na 370 410 400 380 330 320 380 360
Standard error in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
aNumbers of observations were 410 for treatments 1–3 (41 subjects over 10 rounds) and 430 for treatment 4 (43
subjects over 10 rounds)—the reported number accounts for those dropped during the estimation process because of
invariance in the dependent variable.
a fixed effects panel model to account for subject and lottery heterogeneity:
WTPit ¼ ft þ oi þ cit þ eit;
where the dependent variable, WTPit; denotes the ith subject’s willingness to pay for lottery c, in
round t; ft captures any systematic valuation adjustments over time, including linear, quadratic,
cubic or any other form the data dictate; oi captures individual subject effects; cit captures any
lottery attributes which affect valuations, including probabilities and payoffs, and eit is the
contemporaneous additive error term.
Table 5 presents estimates of the low-risk lottery valuation in the market and nonmarket
settings of each treatment. In each case, people do not systematically change their stated values
for low-risk lotteries. In the no-arbitrage baseline, we cannot reject the null that valuations of low-
risk lotteries do not change over the repeated, uncontested trials. This finding is not surprising
since the incidence of reversals with this baseline persisted over time in the no-arbitrage treatment.
In the presence of arbitrage, rates of reversals did decrease significantly; but Table 5 does not
suggest that adjustments in low-risk lottery valuation played a substantial role in increased
rationality. While the set of time effects are significant in four of the six arbitrage treatments,
results for individual periods reflect no systematic adjustment with significant coefficients being
sparse and inconsistent. Consequently, findings do not support the valuation adjustment
hypothesis for the low-risk lottery.
Table 6 tells a different story. Without arbitrage, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that
valuations for high-risk lotteries are equal across trials—indicating that people did not
significantly change their stated values for high-risk lotteries over the repeated, uncontested
trials. With arbitrage, however, tests reject the null and indicate that people decreased their stated
values over time. Again we see that this pattern of valuation adjustment occurred whether the
lotteries were real or hypothetical. In fact, as Fig. 4 illustrates, the valuation adjustment is
stronger in the hypothetical case. This result arises because initial hypothetical valuations are
substantially higher than initial real valuations. But the decline in this hypothetical bias over time
suggests that rationality spillovers might help mitigate this fundamental problem in contingent
valuation.17 Note that the one exception to our valuation results is found in column 8 of Table 4,
in which valuation adjustments for high-risk lotteries are not statistically evident for the
hypothetical–environmental lotteries.
Fig. 4, however, illustrates that aggregate valuation adjustments for environmental lotteries are
similar to those for both money lotteries. We suspect the statistical insignificance in column 8 of
Table 4 arises from the high variance exhibited in the values induced for the environmental
lotteries. Given this single exception, our results support the valuation adjustment hypothesis for
the high-risk lottery. In sum, our early round results do not contradict prior findings which
17See for example [21] for a discussion on hypothetical bias in the nonmarket valuation of public goods, and a verbal
protocol to reduce the bias. Our result corresponds to Cummings and Taylor’s [21] finding that stated hypothetical
values are reduced with a verbal protocol explaining such values may be biased upward. While it is unclear whether the
verbal protocol produces more rational responses or just lower numbers, we are able to unambiguously determine that
lower valuations correspond with more rational behavior. The ease of the verbal protocol is attractive, but the
subjective use of framing effects does not clarify issues of irrational nonmarket behavior. In contrast, implementing
simulated market discipline in the field is relatively more demanding but the rationality of behavior adjustments is
observable, and more importantly, arise from objective market discipline.
suggest (i) reversals seem to be driven more by mispricing of high-risk lotteries than by
intransitivity [16]; and (ii) people overstate their hypothetical values relative to real values. Our
later-round results show; however, that market experience induces people to revise downward
their values to be consistent with their preferences, and that the hypothetical–real gap disappears
[52].
Our results raise an interesting question about future directions in contingent valuation
research: should we turn to psychology to explain biases by broadening the behavioral
underpinnings of choices or do we turn to more powerful institutions that can induce rationality
spillovers which temper these biases? Some argue for the first route given the thin markets that
exist for environmental assets. Valuation work would benefit from channeling resources to
develop a ‘‘behavioral theory of nonmarket valuation’’ which balances theory with pattern
recognition from empirical data (e.g., [32,33]). A maintained belief in such a behavioral theory
suggests that valuation work needs an overhaul with new behavioral restrictions that close the gap
between theory and observation. Such an overhaul would require either the development of a new
theory of value, which fits these behaviors, or a detailed grasp of how deviations from rational
behaviors vary with the degree and the structure of arbitrage across institutional settings [20].
Table 5
Fixed effects results: valuation of low-risk lottery
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket
Round 7 0.1578 0.3025 0.4068** 0.2210 0.1364 0.4456** 0.0542 0.6992**
(0.1909) (0.2382) (0.1720) (0.2028) (0.1561) (0.2060) (0.2091) (0.2896)
Round 8 0.3639* 0.2147 0.2875 0.2517 0.1573 0.2135 0.2095 0.2167
(0.1931) (0.2411) (0.1749) (0.2063) (0.1559) (0.2057) (0.2063) (0.2857)
Round 9 0.4673** 0.4874 0.1812 0.5001** 0.1182 0.2364 0.1822 0.4916*
(0.1922) (0.2399) (0.1743) (0.2055) (0.1571) (0.2074) (0.2094) (0.2900)
Round 10 0.0726 0.2644 0.4266** 0.2024 0.4456*** 0.4017* 0.2068 0.0722
(0.1901) (0.2373) (0.1729) (0.2039) (0.1559) (0.2058) (0.2101) (0.2910)
Round 11 0.4587** 0.3669 0.1227 0.1842 0.1360 0.2639 0.2219 0.2702
(0.1934) (0.2414) (0.1731) (0.2041) (0.1564) (0.2064) (0.2147) (0.2973)
Round 12 0.3962** 0.0450 0.0278 0.3633* 0.0048 0.0307 0.4023* 0.6266**
(0.1912) (0.2386) (0.1731) (0.2041) (0.1561) (0.2060) (0.2109) (0.2921)
Round 13 0.1564 0.3975 0.3046* 0.0044 0.1698 0.0600 0.1874 0.2444
(0.1915) (0.2390) (0.1749) (0.2062) (0.1566) (0.2067) (0.2126) (0.2945)
Round 14 0.0697 0.1702 0.4559*** 0.0903 0.0036 0.2348 0.0545 0.4932*
(0.1926) (0.2403) (0.1735) (0.2046) (0.1567) (0.2068) (0.2074) (0.2872)
Round 15 0.3681* 0.2247 0.0183 0.2048 0.1670 0.1000 0.1234 0.3839
(0.1921) (0.2397) (0.1745) (0.2057) (0.1573) (0.2076) (0.2066) (0.2862)
w2ðft ¼ 0Þ 1.65 0.80 2.07 1.13 2.92 2.92 1.88 1.29
(p-value) (0.1009) (0.6144) (0.0313) (0.3402) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0538) (0.2388)
N 410 410 410 410 410 410 430 430
Standard error in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
Individual lottery effects were significant and controlled for in the regression.
Herein our results suggest a second route—design surveys to harness the rationality spillover
phenomenon. Effort might be well spent to develop interactive, parallel market and nonmarket
exchange institutions that generate the rationality spillovers, which keep homo economicus intact.
Now researchers have an additional choice, and they can decide which approach is more useful for
the question at hand—to reformulate the model to include behavioral extras in the value function
(e.g., hypothetical, intransitivity, yea-saying, scoping), or to create a survey environment that
provides incentives sufficient to reward rational choice over low-probability/high-severity events.
5. Summary and conclusions
Can people achieve rationality strictly on their own? Not necessarily—choices or values
revealed in isolation need not always match preferences [25,29].18 But people who cannot match
preferences and choices open themselves to manipulation by others. An initially irrational person
Table 6
Fixed effects results: valuation of high-risk lottery
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market Nonmarket
Round 7 0.2946 0.2355 0.4989 0.0333 0.2944 0.4435 0.0185 0.3190
(0.3534) (0.4465) (0.3077) (0.3208) (0.3282) (0.5021) (0.3088) (0.7503)
Round 8 0.2780 0.0497 0.1896 0.2670 0.1439 0.8150 0.3563 0.3090
(0.3576) (0.4519) (0.3129) (0.3262) (0.3276) (0.5013) (0.3047) (0.7403)
Round 9 0.0782 0.2999 0.2713 0.0592 0.2136 0.5013 0.3853 0.5890
(0.3559) (0.4497) (0.3117) (0.3250) (0.3303) (0.5054) (0.3092) (0.7513)
Round 10 0.2649 0.0194 0.8706*** 0.6009* 0.6840** 0.9677** 0.1141 0.3123
(0.3520) (0.4449) (0.3092) (0.3224) (0.3278) (0.5015) (0.3103) (0.7538)
Round 11 0.1089 0.0088 0.7361** 0.2738 0.9135*** 0.6590 0.4118 0.1022
(0.3581) (0.4525) (0.3096) (0.3228) (0.3287) (0.5030) (0.3170) (0.7703)
Round 12 0.3755 0.0402 1.0219*** 0.3378 0.5681* 1.6764*** 0.3692 0.4942
(0.3539) (0.4472) (0.3095) (0.3227) (0.3282) (0.5022) (0.3115) (0.7568)
Round 13 0.3675 0.2970 0.8267*** 0.7607** 0.1328*** 1.5633*** 0.8785*** 1.1129
(0.3546) (0.4481) (0.3128) (0.3261) (0.3293) (0.5038) (0.3140) (0.7629)
Round 14 0.1569 0.0468 1.0039*** 0.5027 1.1522*** 1.8174*** 0.5475* 0.7284
(0.3565) (0.4505) (0.3103) (0.3236) (0.3295) (0.5041) (0.3063) (0.7441)
Round 15 0.3706 0.1450 0.9461*** 0.6380** 0.8684*** 1.5616*** 0.5930** 1.0293
(0.3556) (0.4494) (0.3120) (0.3254) (0.3307) (0.5060) (0.3052) (0.7415)
w2ðft ¼ 0Þ 0.29 0.20 2.88 2.13 3.25 3.02 2.60 1.20
(p-value) (0.9775) (0.9937) (0.0027) (0.0267) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0064) (0.2958)
N 410 410 410 410 410 410 430 430
Standard error in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
Individual lottery effects were significant and controlled for in the regression.
18Sen [48,49] and Levi [36] forcefully argue this case.
will ultimately get fed up at being used and will learn how to match choices to preferences.
Rationality sooner or later triumphs because rationality pays. Our experimental results confirm
this conjecture, as do the results of numerous other controlled experiments. When the people in
our experiments observed that their irrational choices lead to unprofitable outcomes, they stopped
making irrational choices.
But what has been unknown, because it has not been asked, is whether there exists a continuity
of rationality across institutional settings. Does the rationality induced from market discipline
spill over to nonmarket settings in which a person is isolated from arbitrage pressures? Our results
suggest that rationality spillovers can exist. This implies that market and nonmarket choice need
not be autonomous spheres of activity but can instead be symbiotic. And the spillover
phenomenon was robust: rationality spillovers occurred whether the nonmarket setting involved
real, hypothetical, or environmental lotteries. Moreover, as people were exposed to arbitrage they
adjusted their statements of value to better reflect their preferences, rather than changing their
preferences.
Our findings do not contradict economists who wish to extend the collective concept of
rationality to thin market or isolated settings, but our results also suggest a dynamic environment
may be a necessary condition. Repeated exposure to competition and discipline was needed to
achieve rationality. And in becoming rational, people refined their statements of value to better
match their preferences. This suggests that efforts to harness the rationality spillover phenomenon
may be worth more attention in nonmarket valuation research, especially when trying to value
risk reductions to the low-probability/high-severity events that define many environmental assets
(e.g., climate change, biodiversity loss). Dynamic survey designs, such as interactive web-based
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Fig. 4. Mean values for high-risk lotteries: real versus hypothetical.
surveys, may be superior to the typical one-shot questionnaire. Settle, Cherry and Shogren [50],
for example, use the approach developed herein to examine public preferences for the
management of an exotic species in Yellowstone National Park. They apply the design of
treatment 4 to the field using both the Internet and laptop computers in the park. Their results
suggest that this method has the potential to provide market discipline to isolated respondents
answering a hypothetical valuation survey. Rationality spillovers exist. Questions about the
particular factors that encourage and discourage the transfer of rationality needed to keep homo
economicus intact await answers.
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